What should be done about Somali pirates by Daniel Sekulich

Daniel Sekulich is a Canadian journalist who has spent the last few years investigating maritime crime. Piracy is a serious organised crime that has international effects and Sekulich assesses what can be done to tackle the problem. The international response to Somali pirates will have a huge effect on how piracy is dealt with from now onwards across the world and will be crucial in our understanding of what is actually possible.

When it comes to the issue of piracy on the high seas, 2008 proved to be a particularly dangerous year for this age-old scourge. International attention has been more and more focused on the problems created by pirates operating off East Africa - where over a hundred vessels were hijacked last year - especially since the hijacking of the MV Faina on 25 September.

The Faina is the vessel that carries aboard her a cargo that includes 33 T-72 battle tanks, as well as considerable other weapons and munitions, as well as 20 crew. But things became even more serious, reaching a crescendo, of sorts, with the seizure of the Saudi supertanker Sirius Star on 15 November. Suddenly we saw the capture of a vessel as long as an aircraft carrier, carrying 2 million barrels of crude oil – over a quarter of Saudi Arabia's daily output of this valuable resource. The value of the tanker and her cargo exceeds a quarter of a billion dollars. The value of the lives of the 25 mariners now being held hostage by pirates cannot ever be estimated.

All of this has led to many to wonder whether the time has come for a more robust and forceful response to this threat, and among the most common ideas put forth are:

• Should international governments dispatch their navies to take up station in those waters?
• Should those warships be allowed to engage pirate vessels, destroying them, arresting suspects, even killing those who resist?
• Should vessels just avoid the waters off the Horn of Africa and the Suez Canal, taking the longer journey around the Cape of Good Hope?
• Is it time to arm civilian seafarers, or place guards on their ships to protect them against attacks?

They sound like good ideas, but it may come as a surprise to many to discover that all of these activities are currently in force, yet piracy continues unabated off Somalia. For instance, it is reported that there are presently at least 14 foreign warships patrolling those seas, representing the navies of the United States, Russia, India, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy and Greece. An EU naval contingent is currently taking up station off Somalia, commanded by British Rear-Admiral Phillip Jones. So there is already a presence in the region, though it hasn't necessarily prevented that many pirate incidents.

Some of those warships have, indeed, engaged in actions against suspected pirate vessels, including the French sending commandos to rescue hostages being held, the British sending forces who killed several pirates, and the Indian navy destroying a vessel believed to be used by pirates. Pirates have been arrested by the US Navy and deposited ashore in Mombasa, Kenya, where the Somali men were later tried, convicted and remain imprisoned. So there is a very robust degree of activity going on from the naval end of things. However, since the Indian navy's recent actions turned out to be tragically wrong, there may be some hesitancy before weapons are next brought to bear on a suspected pirate boat.

As to avoiding the region entirely, this was exactly what the Sirius Star was doing when she was abducted, albeit on a route that is often taken by supertankers of her size (avoiding the confines of the Suez Canal). But the further away from the main shipping routes, the more isolated and potentially vulnerable a vessel becomes. The route through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea is relatively confined, which could make it easier to protect vessels if a more organised naval protection force could be assembled.

The idea of arming mariners remains controversial for a variety of reasons, not the least for fear it will make attackers more likely to fire their own weapons while boarding and seizing ships. For instance, one might assume that the Ukrainian and Russian crew of the Faina knew a little about how to handle small and long arms, having probably done their compulsory military service at home. But even with a cargo full of weapons and munitions, they opted not to fight back against the Somali pirates who overwhelmed the civilian crew.

Finally, we get to the idea of placing guards aboard merchant vessels. This is an expensive proposition - costing at least $10,000 for a short trip, though one could easily expend much more than that on a private escort boat. It also opens things up to an even greater disparity between wealthy and poor seafarers, where Third World mariners become the ransom fodder of pirates.

Most importantly, though, security guards are no guarantee that pirate attacks can be foiled, as the hijacking of the MT Biscaglia shows. It turns out there were three guards aboard the tanker who were employees of Anti-Piracy Maritime Security Solutions (APMSS), a UK-based firm hired to defend the Biscaglia. For reasons still unknown, the guards were unable to thwart the attack and the men (two British, one Irish) ended up jumping overboard. They were later rescued by a German naval warship.

It's extremely important to understand that the actions of pirates off East Africa do affect us here at home. British sailors are currently trying to combat the problem; British mariners are being held hostage by Somali pirates; and the price of goods will be increased because shipping firms must take measures to avoid cargoes being hijacked.

This is a criminal activity that must be addressed. But our efforts, so far, haven't been very effective: Sending vessels the long way around Africa hasn't deterred pirates. Placing security personnel aboard merchant ships hasn't stopped pirates. Deploying over a dozen warships from a variety of nations hasn't prevented attacks. And using armed force has only resulted in the deaths of innocent seafarers.

All of this should be a signal that the current efforts to deal with Somali piracy are failing and that it's time to look at other solutions. Chief among these will be thinking long and hard about addressing the situation ashore, from where these pirates gain their support. And how international efforts are co-ordinated to suppress Somali piracy will become a litmus test for how we react to the next threat posed by pirates, such as in the waters off West Africa.

Author note
Daniel Sekulich is a Canadian journalist who has spent the last few years investigating maritime crime for a new book that will be released this year, entitled 'Terror on the Seas: True Tales of Modern Day Pirates'.

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